



IN THE EURO AREA:T HE CASES
OF IRELAND AND ITALY
1. Introduction
The introduction of the euro and globalisation of real
and financial markets have changed the economic
landscape in which national policymakers operate in
Europe. How are the countries in the eurozone adapt-
ing to the new economic policy environment? The
analysis in this chapter focuses on adjustment in
response to country-specific shocks. The main analy-
sis concerns Ireland and Italy. These countries are
chosen to provide representative case studies, encom-
passing adjustment to excessive monetary stimulus as
well as to recessionary effects of a loss of competi-
tiveness and a fall in foreign demand for the country’s
products. 
While the macroeconomic adjustment problem is the
subject of a vast literature, it is useful to begin our
chapter by reconsidering once again the essential
issues at stake. We will do so by comparing an ideal
monetary union where prices and wages are fully flex-
ible with a union with nominal rigidities. 
In a monetary union among countries with fully flex-
ible prices and wages (and efficient financial mar-
kets), an asymmetric demand boom in a country
would lead to an increase in the price and wage levels
there, reflecting the relative scarcity of its domestic
output. The prices of both non-tradable and tradable
goods would rise, strengthening the real exchange
rate (the country’s price level relative to the price level
abroad, both measured in the same currency) as well
as the terms of trade (the price of the country’s
exports in terms of its imports). Clearly, a higher rel-
ative price would reduce the foreign demand for
domestic output. The country would generally run a
trade deficit, raising external debt, hence debt service
in the long run.
In the presence of nominal rigidities, the short-run
response to a country-specific demand boom instead
“overheats” the economy hit by the shock: A demand
surge raises output above the natural rate. If the
shock is persistent, excess demand still increases
domestic prices and wages, but over time rather than
on impact. Obviously, a slow price adjustment trans-
lates into a temporary increase in expected inflation in
the short run. So, for a given nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate tends to fall on impact, temporarily
reinforcing the boom in demand, a point stressed by
the so-called “Walters critique” of the European
Monetary System.1 But ultimately, an adjustment
occurs because of the increase in the price level, just as
is the case in a flexible price economy. 
Similar considerations apply to country-specific sup-
ply shocks. Consider the macroeconomic effect of a
positive productivity disturbance to domestic tradable
goods. Without nominal rigidities, output prices
would fall, stimulating domestic and foreign demand.
With price stickiness (and a common monetary poli-
cy which responds to country-specific shocks only
marginally), instead, productivity gains imply that
(other things equal) current demand can be satisfied
with less inputs: Employment and capacity utilisation
(inefficiently) fall. 
To the extent that firms and households expect pro-
ductivity gains to persist (or occur) in the future,
productivity disturbances also cause temporary
fluctuations in current demand: Anticipation of
income gains and improvement in production effi-
ciency raise current private consumption (people
feel richer) as well as current domestic investment
demand. Hence, domestic aggregate demand experi-
ences a boom in the short run, which typically wors-
ens the trade balance and causes a current account
deficit. With flexible prices, or a flexible exchange
rate, the short-run demand effect of anticipated pro-
ductivity gains can be so strong that the country’s
terms of trade actually appreciate on impact (see
Corsetti et al. 2006 for time series evidence). Over
time, as new capital is installed (and to the extent
that the expectations of higher productivity are
1 See Walters (1994) and Miller and Sutherland (1990). European
Commission (2006) provides a recent empirical appraisal of the
interest rate effect.realised), supply “catches up” with demand. Be-
cause of the increasing domestic output, the trade
balance improves, the terms of trade deteriorate and
the real exchange rate depreciates. 
A drawn-out process of nominal price and wage
adjustment interferes with the dynamics described
above. Prices and wages are likely to “overshoot” and
cause a large real appreciation at a late stage in the
process, when the increased productive capacity
would actually require declining prices. The conse-
quence is “competitiveness problems”, which are
aggravated if the experience of relatively high output
growth in the short run translates into (over-opti-
mistic) expectations of growth in the medium run,
causing excessive spending and sustained dynamics of
wage and price inflation.
A further dimension of the adjustment process
reflects differences in the degree of nominal rigidity
across sectors within a country. Plausibly, prices tend
to be less rigid in sectors highly exposed to interna-
tional competition. These sectors tend to react swiftly
to demand and supply shocks. Conversely, adjustment
in protected and imperfectly competitive sectors is
typically sluggish. The delayed adjustment in these
sheltered areas of the economy, however, affects pro-
duction costs and efficiency of all firms in the econo-
my, raising aggregate macroeconomic risks. In this
respect, market-oriented reforms, including liberalisa-
tion and deregulation of utilities and services, are an
essential part of the policy adjustment to the new eco-
nomic environment.
The adjustment problem described above is at the
heart of the seminal contributions to the literature on
Optimal Currency Areas (OCA), including Mundell
(1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969) and Ingram
(1973). This literature stresses the costs of adopting a




The costs of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union reconsidered 
Recent literature reconsiders the fundamental issues raised by OCA theory in the framework of a new generation of stylised, 
choice-theoretical models (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2002, Devereux and Engel 2003, Benigno 2004, Corsetti and Pesenti 2005a, 
2005b, Adao et al. 2006 and Corsetti 2006a,b among others). These contributions have emphasised at least three channels through 
which adopting a common currency can decrease national welfare, relative to the benchmark case in which stabilisation policy is
carried out by efficient and credible national policy makers. 
First, if pricing decisions by firms are staggered (that is, only a fraction of firms set a new price every period), efficiency losses 
from a common currency stem from an increase in misalignment of relative prices. The explanation is that, relative to the case of a 
common currency, national monetary policy can better stabilise demand and target the national natural rate of output at the 
current level of prices. This means that, without a common currency, domestic firms resetting their product prices at any given 
point of time have little or no incentive to deviate significantly from the prices charged by the other domestic firms (which do not 
change their prices). In a monetary union, instead, country-specific shocks will have a stronger impact on pricing decisions. To
the extent that firms adjust prices at different times, then, shocks will cause the price of similar products to diverge more 
substantially in a common currency area than with nationally conducted monetary policy, causing a greater (inefficient) dispersion 
in the market valuation of goods within and across product categories (see, for example, Woodford 2003).  
Second, pricing decisions by firms will be affected by the fact that stabilisation policy in a common currency area will not 
necessarily react to shocks affecting demand or costs in the right direction, or with the same intensity, as with nationally 
differentiated monetary policies. Demand and cost uncertainty translates into suboptimal levels of prices and mark-ups. For 
instance, in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a), firms react to demand and marginal cost uncertainty by raising mark-ups and reduce 
their supply ex ante. Other models have analysed how increased price uncertainty will cause trade unions to demand a “risk 
premium” and hence under collective bargaining lead to higher real wages and lower employment, on average, over the business 
cycle (see, for example, Andersen and Sörensen 1988 and Calmfors and Johansson 2004). Recent work has further extended the 
analysis encompassing firms’ dynamics: In Corsetti and Bergin (2005) insufficient stabilisation discourages the creation of new 
firms and products. Combining all these results, the literature points to the possibility that output, employment, consumption and 
investment in a monetary union will be, on average, lower than with nationally differentiated, optimally conducted monetary 
policies.  
Third, monetary policy that is appropriate for the union as a whole may be destabilising in some of its regions. It is well 
understood that monetary shocks destabilise demand and asset markets ex post. However, monetary noise (unrelated to a 
country’s fundamentals) is also consequential ex ante. Specifically, monetary noise is likely to affect the price level and economic 
activity in similar ways as insufficient stabilisation (the second case discussed in this box). Empirical evidence on the effects of 
insufficient stabilisation and monetary noise on the price level is provided by Broda (2006). The empirical test builds on the idea 
that monetary policies in countries adopting a regime of fixed exchange rates are less effective in stabilising domestic marginal 
costs and the output gap, and moves noisily with nominal and financial shocks originating abroad. Broda’s results suggest that the 
price level in these countries is indeed higher than in countries with a flexible rate regime: the difference is as high as 20 percent 
for emerging markets, somewhat smaller (and not statistically significant) for developed countries.
a)
a) Broda (2006) shows that alternative explanations, including overshooting, inertia and fiscal policies, appear to play a lesser role in accounting for 
price level differences than the exchange rate regime. EEAG Report 61
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rate flexibility, because of asymmetric (country-spe-
cific) temporary shocks. By logical extension the
analysis also applies to asymmetric short-run
responses to symmetric (common) shocks, including
unexpected components of monetary policy. Recent
theoretical analysis of these costs of a common cur-
rency is reviewed in Box 2.1. Specifically, the argu-
ment is that these asymmetries weaken the case for a
common currency, as members of a monetary union
lose the benefits from (i) monetary policy autonomy
as well as from (ii) stabilising movements in the
exchange rate.
The literature however also emphasises that the costs
of joining a monetary union are low if at least one of
the following is true: (a) prices and wages are suffi-
ciently flexible; (b) fiscal policy effectively stabilises
national economies; (c) consumption risk is suffi-
ciently diversified across borders (or international
financial markets work efficiently, so that agents can
easily smooth consumption); (d) factors are suffi-
ciently mobile also in the short run, at low private and
social costs; (e) there are little asymmetries in shocks
and in macroeconomic transmission.2 This frame-
work underlies most analysis of stabilisation policy
design and reform. In what follows, the analysis of
Ireland and Italy will mainly focus on points (a) and
(d) above. 
To facilitate comparison, Table 2.1 reports a set of
indicators of the macroeconomic performance of the
two countries in our sample, as well as of the euro
area as a whole, based on the official Autumn 2006
forecast by the European Commission. This Table will
be referred to throughout the analysis. 
2. Ireland
Ireland entered the euro area well into a sustained
period of economic expansion marked by profound
changes in the structure of the economy and its place
in the global economy. The most apparent indicators
of the Irish success are the rapid rise in per capita
GDP and national income, now well above the EU
average, and the fall of unemployment rates, from the
double-digit figures in the 1980s to record lows
around four percent in recent years. Rapid growth
continued after the adoption of the euro, despite
many changes in the international and domestic envi-
ronment. 
What makes the case of Ireland especially interesting
in an analysis of adjustment is the country’s strong
macroeconomic performance, clearly asymmetric rel-
ative to the rest of the euro area. The asymmetry in
macro performance is, to a large extent, explained by
income convergence and catching-up. But because of
this country’s real and financial openness income con-
vergence occurred along an unusually fast and suc-
cessful path, as a steady inflow of FDI led Ireland to
specialise in high-tech sectors with a highly elastic
demand with respect to world growth. 
At cyclical frequencies, many of the global exoge-
nous shocks hitting the Irish economy were common
to the rest of the euro area (for example, commodity
price disturbances), although in some cases they
might have hit the Irish economy more directly: This
is the case of the collapse of the ICT share prices in
2000. An example of country-specific shocks is the
foot-and-mouth disease starting in 2001. None of
these shocks appear to have been particularly conse-
quential.
The most apparent and controversial source of
macroeconomic imbalance for Ireland has instead
been the strong monetary stimulus since the end of
the 1990s, when European monetary policies became
strictly coordinated in the last stage of nominal con-
vergence before the introduction of the euro. (Soon
afterwards, the monetary stimulus was compounded
by a weakening currency.) A relatively loose monetary
stance was motivated by the cyclical conditions in the
euro area as a whole, but arguably inappropriate for
Ireland: It created undue demand pressures in the
Irish economy. Indeed, as shown in Table 2.1, esti-
mates of the output gap in the first years of the euro
point to overheating. Correspondingly, estimates of
the appropriate policy interest rate implied by a
Taylor Rule for Ireland have been consistently above
the ECB rate (see the analysis in Section 4.2 of
Chapter 1 in this report).
A well-understood consequence of low interest rates
is their effects on property prices. Ireland is one of
2 Potentially large benefits of a monetary union include those from
policy delegation, gains from political integration (reflecting the
opinion that this is more likely in the presence of monetary union),
and saving on transaction costs (increasing cross-border trade).
These arguments have played an important role in the debate on
EMU. It is well understood that they can explain why some small
European countries, whose specific cyclical conditions have a very
limited weight in the European Central Bank’s decisions, have
nonetheless been eager to adopt the euro. Most importantly, they
can explain why some countries that are currently suffering from
competitiveness or fiscal problems do not find it attractive to leave
the euro area, as life outside it would expose them to large financial
shocks. See, for example, Calmfors et al. (1997) or HM Treasury
(2003) for surveys and assessments of the arguments for and against
EMU entry.the countries with the strongest housing price
dynamics. Figure 2.1 displays the evolution of hous-
ing prices in real terms for Ireland, Italy, Spain and
the euro area as a whole since 2000. In Ireland, the
price of housing is apparently growing well above
the euro area average, although not as fast as in
Spain (see the analysis in Chapter 5 of the 2005
EEAG report). By fuelling the property price boom,
low interest rates stimulated the demand for new
housing in Ireland,3 being one of the main determi-
nants of the strong expansion of the construction
sector.
In 2005, the construction sector in Ireland accounted
for approximately 20 percent of the country’s GDP
and employed more than 10 percent of the labour
force (see European Commission 2006a). To the
extent that the growth of the construction sector is




Real GDP growth 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  9.9 6.1 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 
Italy  2.1  0.3 0 1.1 0 1.3 
Euro area  2.8 0.9 0.8 2.1 1.3 2.1 
Output gap 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  3.2 3.5 1.7 0.1  –  0.5  -1.4 
Italy  0.5  1.1  0  – 0.2  – 1.4  -1 
Euro area  0.5  0.5  – 0.6  – 0.5  – 1.1  -0.6 
Inflation (change in HICP) 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  3 4.7 4 2.3  2.2  2.9 
Italy  2.1 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 
Euro area  1.7 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Growth in real compensation per head 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  0.8 -0.3 0.7 4.5 3.3 2.4 
Italy  –  0.3  -0.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 
Euro area  0.6 0.9 0.7 0.4  –  0.1 0 
Change in real effective exchange rate 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  –  5.5  1.6 8.1 6.9 2.4 2.5 
Italy  –  2 3.5 8.1 3.1 0.3 1.4 
Euro area  – 5.5  3.2  10.4  2.3  – 2.8  – 1.8 
Note: relative to 35 countries (EU24 excl. Luxemburg, Australia, Bulgaria, China, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Romania, 
Russia, Turkey, UK, US). 
Fiscal balance of general government (as a percentage of GDP) 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  2.3  –  0.4  0.3 1.5 1.1 1.2 
Italy  – 2.2  – 2.9  – 3.5  – 3.4  – 4.1  – 4.7 
Euro area  n.a.  – 2.5  – 3.1  – 2.8  – 2.4  -2 
Cyclically adjusted fiscal balance of general government (as a percentage of GDP) 
    1997–2001  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Ireland  1.1  – 1.8  – 0.3  1.4  1.3  1.7 
Italy  – 2.5  – 3.4  – 3.5  – 3.3  – 3.4  – 4.1 
Euro area  n.a.  – 2.8  – 2.7  – 2.5  – 1.9  – 1.7 
Note: Real effective exchange rates are defines as real unit labour costs. 
Source: European Commission (2006b). 
3 In real terms, Irish housing prices grew at an average rate of
17.6 percent per annum between 1995 and 2000. After 2000, housing
prices have continued to appreciate in real terms at the average rate
of 8.3 percent (data are from OECD 2006). The dynamics of Irish
housing prices is obviously driven to a large extent by the ongoing
process of income convergence. Nevertheless, persistently low inter-
est rates have arguably played a key role in keeping the real rate of
appreciation high.EEAG Report 63
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example of a real macroeconomic cost, in terms of
misallocation of capital and resources.4
In addition, while fiscal developments overall in
Ireland have been remarkably sound, in the early
years of the euro, fiscal policy was pro-cyclical.
Table 2.1 shows that, up to 2004, the Irish cyclically
corrected balance was stronger than the actual bal-
ance. At the European level, the Irish fiscal stance was
criticised in the past on the ground that fiscal stimu-
lus was inappropriate in the presence of already
strong private demand growth and positive monetary
stimulus.5 Yet high spending on infrastructure is
arguably desirable along the convergence process,
especially when high growth translates into a falling
public debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, one may argue
that “procyclical spending”is appropriate if the cycli-
cal movements are driven by productivity fluctua-
tions. When output expands in response to high pro-
ductivity, it is efficient to increase
production of all goods, both
private and public.
How did the Irish economy cope
with the prolonged period of
expansionary macroeconomic
policy? In response to booming
demand, Irish labour costs rela-
tive to the Irish trading partners,
which were on a downward trend
between 1985 and 2000, have
increased fast in the years of the
euro. According to the European
Commission data shown in
Table 2.1, in the period 2004 to
2006, the rate of growth of real
compensation per worker in Ire-
land exceeded by 10 percentage
points the average for the euro
area.6 Due to the high productiv-
ity growth, relative unit labour
costs have increased by less, but the rises have still
been significant.7 Figure 2.2 displays an index of the
real effective exchange rate between 2000 and 2006 for
a sample of European countries based on unit labour
costs relative to 15 trading partners. Two countries
stand out most vividly: Germany, which recorded the
largest fall in relative unit labour costs (hence the
largest gain in competitiveness), and Ireland, which
recorded the largest rise. 
Figure 2.3 shows the level of hourly labour costs in
2005 for a selected sample of European countries. For
2005, the hourly labour costs in Ireland are compara-
Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2
4 Similar considerations apply to Spain.
Currently, Spain’s main problem is the sus-
tainability of a growth that has so far
delivered results well above the euro area
average, but is based on a construction and
real estate boom. Investment in housing
currently amounts to 1/3 of total invest-
ment. With an inflation rate well above the
euro area average (even widening since
2003), the country is losing competitive-
ness, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. Different
from Ireland, however, Spain is lagging in
productivity growth, and experiencing
large external deficits.
5 In the meeting of the Ecofin Council on
12 February 2000, Ireland’s budgetary plan
for 2001 was judged inconsistent with the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, be-
cause it was inappropriately expansionary.
The Ecofin Council issued a recommenda-
tion to Ireland to correct its budgetary
position.
6 Honohan and Leddin (2005) report that hourly earnings relative to
trading partners rose by approximately 25 percent between 2000 and
2004.
7 See Chapter 2 of EEAG (2006) for an analysis of the causes of the
high productivity growth in Ireland.ble with those in the UK and France, higher than the
Italian ones, although still substantially below the
German ones (about 25 percent lower). 
The loss of cost competitiveness relative to the other
European countries, as well as relative to the world at
large (especially after the euro started to appreciate in
2002), has not so far translated into a notable slow-
down in exports. Arguably, this is due to the fact that
Irish exports are concentrated in sectors, like ICT,
which respond quite positively to the current high
growth in the global economy.
Honohan and Leddin (2005)
have stressed an additional ele-
ment in the Irish dynamic adjust-
ment. In principle, a strong de-
mand expansion should have cre-
ated a severe labour shortage.
But the booming economy stimu-
lated a strong migratory inflow,
with two major effects: first, the
increasing supply of labour con-
tained upward pressures on
wages somewhat, especially in
low-skill occupations.8 Second,
the additional workers in the
economy raised aggregate de-
mand, reinforcing the expansion-
ary macroeconomic stance for
the economy as a whole. Since the
availability of jobs acts as a
strong driving force for migratory
decisions, a sustained economic
boom created incentives for fur-
ther migration. Figure 2.4 illus-
trates the strong acceleration of
net inflows of people in recent
years. In 2006, 86,900 people
immigrated into Ireland, which is
equivalent to 2.1 percent of the
Irish population and 4.1 percent
of the labour force.
Overall, then, during the long-
lasting phase of high growth,
adjustment seems to have worked
as predicted by theory, through
real exchange rates and migrato-
ry movements. An overall expan-
sionary policy mix caused real
appreciation, although adjust-
ment through wages and labour
costs was arguably contained
because the strong migratory inflow reduced excess
demand in the labour market. 
The concentration of Irish exports in dynamic sectors
with a high elasticity with respect to world demand
makes Ireland’s export performance vulnerable to





8 Barret and McCarthy (2006) have shown that the education level of
immigrants to Ireland is actually quite high relative to the Irish pop-
ulation. However, migrants are found to earn 18 percent less than
natives, controlling for education and years of work experience (this
average reflects large differences across immigrants from English-
speaking and non-English speaking countries).EEAG Report 65
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slowdown. By the same token, the macroeconomic
performance of Ireland would be heavily exposed to a
correction in property prices, likely to cause a severe
drop in activity in the construction sector (see, for
example, Roche 2003). For these reasons, there is sub-
stantial macroeconomic risk built into the current
state of the Irish economy. 
Already in our 2002 EEAG report, we discussed
adjustment problems with specific reference to the
Irish case (see Chapter 4). In that report, we empha-
sised macroeconomic risks due to asymmetries in the
adjustment process via factor prices and the real
exchange rate. Adjustment to demand shocks via this
channel tends to work effectively in response to ex-
pansionary shocks. It tends to be sluggish in response
to negative shocks. In the case of Ireland, the risk is
that recent high growth rates would translate into sus-
tained expectations of growth in labour compensa-
tion, which may become incompatible with macro-
economic stability, especially once the process of
income convergence comes to an end. There is thus a
risk that the real exchange rate will overshoot. An
important issue raised by the Irish case is the extent to
which overvaluation in the goods market can interact
with property prices and developments in the con-
struction sector. The demand boom phase has been
reinforced and arguably prolonged by the increases in
property prices and a construction boom. The issue is
whether and to what extent a possible output down-
turn can be exacerbated by a fall in property prices
reducing consumption demand, but also generating a
crisis in the construction sector.9
In the case of a sharp slow down of the construction
sector, adjustment would require some combination of
migratory outflows and changes in the sectoral com-
position of employment. Such a slowdown would also
raise the demand for public support of unemployed
foreign workers, putting pressure on the Irish welfare
state. In this respect it is worth stressing that a large
fraction of migrants to Ireland are from the EU10
countries. In 2005, for instance, 26,200 out of 70,000
immigrants came from the EU10; in 2006, it was
37,400 out of 86,900 (Central Statistics Office 2006). 
The Irish experience raises interesting issues regarding
the contribution that labour mobility from outside
the euro area can make to macroeconomic adjustment
within the area. Clearly, migration flows from outside
the euro area have helped contain labour shortages,
especially for low-skilled workers. Absent the flow, we
would have observed an even faster wage and price
adjustment.10
However, to some extent, the contribution of migra-
tion to adjustment is hampered by its indirect, desta-
bilising effect on demand, due to the fact that, as men-
tioned above, new workers also raise domestic aggre-
gate spending. For instance, Honohan and Leddin
(2005) have stressed that migration actually can mag-
nify (rather than bridge) demand imbalances. In
Ireland, the demand for new housing by migrants is
one of the factors contributing to the strong dynam-
ics of the real estate market, hence to the prolonged
boom in the construction sector.11
The macroeconomic risk of a hard landing after a
strong expansionary period is illustrated by the expe-
rience of the Netherlands in the last decade, as
reviewed by the European Commission (2006). This
country is similar to Ireland as regards its degree of
openness. (Although the high volume of exports and
imports reflects to a large extent the importance of
Dutch ports in Europe.) In contrast to Ireland, how-
ever, its growth is arguably no longer driven by
income convergence. 
The Netherlands experienced a strong economic
boom in the second half of the 1990s, when strong
wealth effects from asset price appreciation in the
housing12 and the stock markets drove up domestic
demand. The unemployment rate fell to extraordinary
low levels – around 2 percent in 2001. The boom led
to a period of strong wage and price adjustments
around 2000, causing inflation to peak at above 5 per-
9 Putting it another way: In Ireland there are two potential sources
of crisis, the strength of the real exchange rate, which may become a
problem if a global slowdown reduces external demand for the coun-
try’s products, and a collapse in house prices, which would reduce
consumption (via wealth effects) as well as the level of activity in the
construction sector.
10 The original contributions to OCA theory emphasised migration
flows within the currency area, which have stabilising effects in both
the country of origin and the country of destination. Adjustment via
net migratory flows from outside the currency area still mitigates
imbalances in specific countries, but also affects the tightness of the
labour market for the monetary union as a whole. 
11 Honohan and Leddin (2005) present a model in which, because of
the additional demand expressed by migrant workers, adjustment
through migration can be subject to long lags and complex dynam-
ics, including a succession of self-fulfilling expansion and contrac-
tion equilibria. A similar model could be applied to Spain, where
migrants have provided cheap labour for the construction sector (as
well as the tourist sector). Strictly speaking, however, adjustment via
labour mobility at cyclical frequencies should work via temporary
changes in net migration flows in response to demand shocks (see
Buiter et al. 1998). In other words, it should affect net migration
flows in the short run, without influencing the stock of workers in
the long run (arguably, it is the latter that drives the demand for
housing).
12 Between 1995 and 2001, house prices in real terms grew by
10.7 percent per annum in real terms in the Netherlands, against
1.5 percent in the euro area. In the period 2002 to 2005, however, the
real appreciation of house prices was only 3.2 percent per annum
(against an average 5.2 percent increase for the euro area).cent in 2001.13 Thus, over the
turn of the millennium, the
Netherlands rapidly lost price
and wage competitiveness, espe-
cially relative to Germany, its
main trading partner. When the
boom in internal demand faded
away, low competitiveness exac-
erbated the slowdown.14
3. Italy
The Italian case is in many
dimensions the opposite relative
to the Irish one. While Ireland
has enjoyed rapid growth and
income convergence through specialisation in dynam-
ic, high-tech sectors, Italy’s long-term growth has
slowed down considerably. Italian manufacturing
firms, largely specialising in traditional low-tech
industries, have been facing increased competition
from emerging market economies. Ireland is a small,
very open economy, with substantial foreign direct
investment and financial portfolio diversification.
Italy is a medium-sized, open economy with substan-
tial barriers to foreign capital. Before the EMU,
Ireland had built a strong fiscal framework. Italy
entered the EMU with a substantial stock of public
debt, which has constrained the scope for adjustment
policies, implying short-run fiscal costs. The structur-
al fiscal stance has actually deteriorated after joining
the euro area (see Table 2.1). The monetary stance at
the onset of the common currency, excessively expan-
sionary for Ireland, was neutral for Italy. It became
instead too tight over time (see the analysis in Section
4.2 of Chapter 1). 
Our analysis focuses on Italy as
an example of slow adjustment
in response to shocks reducing
foreign demand. The creation of
a common European currency
coincided with a strong crisis in competitiveness and
productivity in Italy, exacerbated by the appreciation
of the euro since 2002. 
The Italian export crisis has not erupted suddenly but
has been developing since the mid-1990s. Between
1995 and 2005, the share of Italian exports in world
exports at constant prices fell from 4.6 to 2.7 percent,
a 40 percent drop. The comparison with Germany,
shown in Figure 2.5, is striking: Over the same period,
the German export share grew by 15 percent. If ex-
ports shares are instead calculated at current prices,
the share of Italian exports in world exports fell from
4.6 to 3.7 percent (see De Nardis and Traù 2005). Of
course, Italy is not the only developed country to lose
market shares over the period, as there is a trend shift
in favour of the emerging market economies. Figure
2.6 plots the evolution of the share of national





13 The European Commission (2006a)
pointed out that “as high economic growth
persisted, most estimates of Dutch struc-
tural economic growth were revised
upwards. With the benefit of hindsight, it
can be concluded that the economic boom
period from 1996 onwards was not struc-
tural, but of a temporary nature” (p. 224).
14 The real exchange rate kept appreciating
during the recession. In part because of the
euro appreciation vis-à-vis the dollar, it
appreciated by 3.9 percent in 2002 and
4.8 percent in 2003, years in which the
growth of the Dutch GDP ground to a halt
(0.1 and – 0.1, respectively).EEAG Report 67
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European countries. With the exception of Ireland,
most countries lost positions over the period 1995 to
2005. Italy and France recorded the largest drops,
closely followed by the UK. 
Nonetheless, the Italian competitiveness crisis sub-
stantially worsened after 2002, coincident with the
appreciation of the euro. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 display
industrial production and capacity utilisation distin-
guished among sectors. It is apparent that the Italian
export crisis became acute after 2002. The index of
industrial production for the exporting sectors lost
approximately 6 points relative to non-exporting sec-
tors from 2003 on. A similar gap can be detected for
capacity utilisation. 
In response to the large external shock to export
demand, adjustment would require real deprecia-
tion. This has not yet occurred in Italy. The real
exchange rate of Italy has been
appreciating rather steadily
since the introduction of the
euro, as shown by Table 2.1 and
Figure 2.2. Focusing on manu-
facturing only, the Bank of Italy
reports that between 2000 and
2005, unit labour costs in Italy
increased by approximately
30 percent relative to the coun-
try’s main trading partners; in
the same period, relative unit
labour costs in manufacturing
rose by 10 percent in France and
remained stable in Germany.
In part, the relative increase in
Italian unit labour costs is due
to the growth of wages. While
low in real terms, wage growth
was positive overall and above
the euro area average (see Tab-
le 2.1). In a significant way, how-
ever, the increase in relative unit
costs is also a consequence of
the other striking dimension of
the Italian competitiveness crisis,
which is the disappointing per-
formance of productivity. As
shown in Table 2.2, after grow-
ing by 1 percent per year in the
second half of the 1990s, labour
productivity in Italy stopped
growing in 2000 (against positive
although low growth for the euro
area as a whole), and actually
fell in three years. The Italian productivity problem
encompasses virtually all sectors of the economy. In
the period 2001 to 2005, labour productivity con-
tracted in manufacturing (at the rate of 0.8 percent
per annum), as well as in the service sector (Banca
d’Italia 2006a). Similar developments have also
characterised total factor productivity.15
The combination of positive growth in compensation
and negative growth in productivity has raised unit
labour costs at rates clearly incompatible with the
goal of improving competitiveness. By way of exam-
Figure 2.7
Figure 2.8
15 According to Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in Chapter 4 of this report, GDP
per hour contracted by, on average, 0.4 percent and total factor pro-
ductivity in the overall economy by 1.2 percent per annum in Italy
over the 2000 to 2004 period. These developments have no counter-
parts in other European countries. See also Chapter 2 of the 2006
EEAG report for a more detailed analysis of different growth (or
non-growth) models in Europe.ple, in Italian industry, labour costs increased by
2.4 percent in 2005, and 4.5 percent in the first half-
year of 2006. Labour productivity fell by 0.7 percent
in 2005, and only grew by 0.2 percent in the first half-
year of 2006 (Banca d’Italia 2006b). As a result, unit
labour costs rose by 3.1 and 4.4 percent, respectively.
For the economy as a whole, labour costs rose by
2.4 percent in 2005, and 3.2 percent in the first half of
2006. 
It is worth stressing that, over the last few years, Italy
underwent notable changes in the labour market. The
Italian unemployment rate dropped from double-digit
figures in the 1990s to 7.1 percent in 2006,16 well
below the average of the euro area. To a large extent,
employment growth was driven by the diffusion of
part-time and irregular jobs. For example, in 2005,
full-time jobs increased by 1.3 percent, part-time jobs
by 7.2 percent (accounting for 13 percent of depen-
dent employment). Employment on fixed-term con-
tracts also rose by 6.2 percent (accounting for
12.3 percent of dependent employment). Similar pat-
terns characterised 2006.17 These developments follow
recent labour market reforms (especially the so-called
‘legge Biagi’ from 2003,18 which have increased the
flexibility of labour contracts. Increasing flexibility in
the labour market has clearly contributed to the
adjustment process, insofar as it has created opportu-
nities for firms to save on overall labour costs (includ-
ing both labour compensation and administrative
costs such as firing costs). Nonetheless, it has also cre-
ated an economic and social divide between workers
with permanent contracts (the “insiders”) and work-
ers with fixed-term renewable contracts. 
The strong dynamics of labour costs correspond to
that of inflation, which has remained above the euro
area inflation until 2005 (see Table 2.1). There are
notable differences in the evolution of prices in the
tradables and non-tradables sector. Between 2002 and
2005, the HICP-based inflation rate was as high as
2.5 percent per annum, on average (see Table 2.1).
Over the same period, the average annual increase in
the price of services was 2.9 percent per annum,
whereas that of the price of goods (excluding foods
and energy) was only 1.8 (see Banca d’Italia 2006a). 
In the presence of country-specific competitiveness
problems in a monetary union, national fiscal policy
faces a well-known trade-off. Gaining competitiveness
requires disinflation, hence a fiscal contraction; sup-
porting output and employment requires a fiscal
expansion. As shown by Table 2.1, Italy did not fol-
low the first option: The general stance of the govern-
ment remained expansionary.
Before the euro, Italy’s policymakers responded sys-
tematically to competitiveness losses with nominal
devaluation accompanied by some measures of fiscal
consolidation and contraction of domestic demand.
This was the case in the 1970s, in a high inflation envi-
ronment, as well as throughout the 1980s, in an envi-
ronment of declining inflation. The currency crisis of
1992 to 1993 showed that the recipe could work rela-
tively well for Italy as well as for other European
countries, including the UK, Spain, Portugal, Finland
and Sweden (see the discussion of the latter two coun-
tries in Section 5 of Chapter 4). Devaluation allowed




Labour productivity growth (real GDP per hour, percentage change) 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ireland  4.5 4.3 9.7 5.3 5.3 4.1 3.9 4.9 4.0 1.4 1.0 
Italy  3.0 0.4 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.6  –  1.3  –  0.4  0.7  –  0.9 
Netherlands  2.4  –  0.5  –  0.1  3.0 1.7 2.0 1.3 1.8 0.7 2.9 1.3 
Spain  0.4  – 0.1  0.0  – 0.8  0.1  – 0.4  – 0.6  0.7  – 1.1  – 0.7  – 1.3 
Euro area  2.1 1.1 2.1 1.1 1.6 2.5 0.9 1.3 0.4 1.1 0.4 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, calculations by the EEAG. 
16 This fall in unemployment corresponds to an increase in the share
of dependent workers in total employment. In 2005, for instance,
dependent employment increased by 2.6 percent; self-employment
contracted by 4.1 percent. Banca d’Italia (2006a) emphasises the
record magnitude of the drop in self-employment in 2005, driven by
a reduction in activity by members of family businesses (– 25.7 per-
cent) and cooperatives (– 28.3 percent), as well as by a reduction in
temporary jobs (– 24.3 percent) usually performed by young women.
About 15 percent of previously self-employed workers found a per-
manent job. 
17 At the same time as the rest of Europe, Italy experienced a steady
inflow of migrants from outside the area. Recorded resident workers
have increased significantly after the regularisation by law of 650000
irregular immigrants in 2002 (Law 189, July 2002). 
18 This ‘legge Biagi’ (legge delega 30/2003) regulates a number of
novel types of labour contracts, including apprenticeship, occasion-
al employment, part-time jobs, job sharing, staff-leasing and job on
call (see Montuschi et al. 2004 and Pirrone and Sestito 2006). An
interesting question is the extent to which (if any) the growth of tem-
porary and fixed-term jobs over permanent jobs can explain the dis-
appointing productivity performance. On the one hand, workers
without tenure may have a strong incentive to raise their efforts (see
Ichino and Riphahn 2005). On the other hand, to the extent that
turnover of workers increases, there could be a loss of firm-specific
and/or occupation-specific human capital (see Marimon and
Zilibotti 1999 and Autor et al. 2006).EEAG Report 69
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ingly little effects on domestic prices and financial sta-
bility, despite a regime of high capital mobility (see
Buiter et al. 1998 for a discussion). 
With the euro, it is still possible to adopt a similar pol-
icy strategy, engineering a so-called internal devalua-
tion. This consists of fiscal measures aimed at reduc-
ing the labour costs faced by firms. Indeed, the coali-
tion that won the election in spring 2006 placed an
internal devaluation at the centre of its electoral pro-
gramme in the form of a cut (up to five percentage
points) of the “tax wedge” between the take-home
pay by the workers and the firms’ cost of employing
them. Such an internal devaluation is being gradually
implemented in the form of deductions from the
Italian tax on regional productive activities (IRAP),
whose base includes labour costs, over the period
2007 to 2009. Deductions are selective and benefit
only non-financial firms (excluding public utilities).
As part of the tax cut benefits the workers, the mea-
sure reduces firms’ labour costs by about 3 percent.
But internal devaluation, which the EEAG group
endorses, can only compensate, in small part, for the
positive inflation differential vis-à-vis the rest of the
euro area experienced by Italy in the last few years.
Because cuts in firms’ payroll taxes need to be
financed through increases in other taxes or through
cuts in government expenditures, an internal devalua-
tion can only be small and have the character of a
one-off measure. Hence, its effectiveness is very limit-
ed. However, this is not only a disadvantage. The con-
straint that a government cannot use this instrument
repeatedly prevents firms from delaying adjustment
on expectations of further adoption of the same mea-
sure, as argued, for example, by the Calmfors Com-
mission in Sweden (Calmfors et al. 1997) and
Calmfors (1998). 
Most crucially, however, there are apparent reasons
why internal devaluation alone cannot be the solu-
tion to the current Italian crisis. Substituting internal
devaluation for exchange rate devaluation cannot
address the problems arising from increasing compe-
tition from emerging markets. Italian exports have
been traditionally strong in light manufacturing
(machinery and mechanical utensils), as well as in
textiles, apparel, leather products and shoes, now
increasingly supplied by emerging markets at low
prices. Italian firms have mainly lost ground in the
market for low- to medium-quality varieties of these
products. The crucial issue is then: What prevents
Italian industry from redirecting the use of its
human and physical capital towards the production
of different products or high-quality varieties of the
above products? The current crisis clearly reflects
structural constraints, which limit the ability of
Italian firms to innovate and acquire new technolo-
gies (for example, the slow acquisition of ICT tech-
nology was highlighted in Chapter 2 of last year’s
EEAG report).19
What is the “right” product specialisation for Italian
firms? To put it simply: There is no answer to the
above question other than the one given by interna-
tional markets. It would be a mistake to design poli-
cies under the presumption that the public sector is a
better judge than private markets in identifying prof-
itable and dynamic activities. The Italian government
may at one point be tempted to adopt programmes of
subsidies and public investment to the benefit of spe-
cific firms and sectors, using the misleading label of
industrial policy. The substantial body of evidence on
failures of such “dirigisme” makes it clear that such
an approach would plainly result in misallocation and
social waste. However, the weak fiscal conditions in
Italy impose a natural constraint on such policy
option.
There are instead structural measures that could sub-
stantially help Italian firms. While a thorough analy-
sis of these measures is outside the scope of a chapter
on cyclical adjustment to shocks, we stress the lessons
from the recent experience of Scandinavian countries
reviewed in Chapter 4 of this report. This chapter
points to the benefits of market liberalisation and
pro-competition policies as cornerstones of successful
policy strategies. In the last decade, Sweden and
Finland have benefited very much from high produc-
tivity growth and innovation, which have helped them
improve their competitive positions in the presence of
fairly high rates of wage growth. Chapter 4 argues
19 A well-known feature of the Italian industrial structure is the small
average dimension of Italian firms or, more precisely, the abnormal-
ly low share of medium-sized enterprises. In principle, falling trade
costs and advances in ICT technology should have been good news
for Italy, to the extent that small firms could take advantage of low
fixed costs to acceding larger markets for firms’ output and inputs.
However, as argued by Rossi (2005), Italian firms are perhaps too
small to benefit from globalisation: For a number of technical,
organisational and economic reasons, benefits from low trade costs
and ICT are better reaped by medium-sized firms, which is the cate-
gory that is vastly under-represented in Italy (see Trento and
Warglien 2003). There is no scarcity of studies on the structural
determinants of firm size in Italy that stress both economic and soci-
ological factors. The consensus view appears to emphasise two inter-
related factors (see Barca et al. 1994). On the one hand, Italian entre-
preneurs seem extremely reluctant to grow using external finance and
thus to lose or dilute their control over the business. This attitude
may be partly cultural, but clearly also reflects deficiencies in both
the structure of the Italian financial markets and intermediaries as
well as in the normative and judicial system. On the other hand, a
larger size raises the fiscal visibility of a firm, reducing the room for
tax evasion (see also Onida 2004). that product market deregulation was an important
factor behind this development. 
Deregulation policy would involve large benefits also
for short-run output stabilisation and adjustment of
competitiveness. The reason is that with the euro and
globalisation of real and financial markets, the divide
between firms exposed to external competition, on the
one hand, and firms and activities enjoying rents due
to the lack of competition, on the other hand, be-
comes deeper. The latter firms have a much lower in-
centive to raise efficiency and reduce prices in
response to external (foreign demand) shocks.
Examples are provided by Italian public services,
energy, telecommunications and transportation
industries. The lack of efficiency and competitive
pricing in these sectors creates a cost disadvantage for
all firms operating in the country; privileges and
monopoly rents in protected sectors translate into
high costs for the entrepreneurs in the tradable sector,
reducing their ability to compete in the international
markets (see the economic analysis of economic
nationalism in Chapter 6 of this report).
Moreover, to the extent that increasing competition
leads to innovation and adoption of new technology,
liberalisation should increase the rate of productivi-
ty growth. In this respect, the Scandinavian experi-
ence reviewed in Chapter 4 points to the importance
of the interplay between a well-educated workforce
and investment in ICT technology (capital-skill com-
plementarity). This is not an item usually discussed
in relation to macroeconomic adjustment in a cur-
rency area. However, in the case of Italy, slow or neg-
ative growth in labour and total factor productivity
is an important dimension of the competitiveness
problem. A change in this trend is an essential com-
ponent of adjustment. For all these reasons, de-
regulation measures are a natural complement to
traditional stabilisation measures, such as internal
devaluation.20
In light of these considerations, the long delay in the
pace of structural product market reform in Italy has
been highly unfortunate. According to the Global
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic
Forum (Lopez-Claros et al. 2006) Italy’s rank still fell
by four positions between 2005 and 2006. Italy’s rank
is now 42 ahead of Greece (47), but behind Portugal
(34) and Spain (28). 
At the end of 2006, there are several indicators of
improvements in the macroeconomic outlook in Italy.
In some sectors, this turnaround could reflect the end
of a restructuring phase in which firms invested in
higher quality product lines and outsourced some seg-
ments of their production process (a view suggested
by anecdotal rather than hard evidence). The positive
outlook should be taken as an opportunity for the
Italian government to accelerate the implementation
of reforms and deregulations promised in its electoral
programme, so as to create the premise for a return to
growth. 
However, another possibility is that positive cyclical
growth, to a large extent driven by the dynamics of
the global economy as well as of the rest of Europe,
could generate complacency and defence of the status
quo. In the past few years, for instance, a positive
macroeconomic outlook and low interest rates gave
the Italian government an opportunity to proceed
towards fiscal consolidation. As the analysis in the
previous EEAG reports and Chapter 1 of this report
shows, the fiscal outlook actually worsened.
Complacency would be quite damaging in the present
situation.
4. Conclusions 
The first years in the life of the euro have witnessed a
variety of country-specific experiences as regards
macroeconomic adjustment in the new policy envi-
ronment of EMU. The two case studies, of Ireland
and Italy, in this chapter shed light on the adjustment
problems in response to both expansionary and con-
tractionary shocks. 
The main conclusions of the chapter, which square
quite well with the received wisdom in academic and
policy analyses, can be summarised as follows. First,
stabilising movements of the real exchange rate are
asymmetric: Appreciation is faster in response to a
booming demand than depreciation in response to
negative shocks, which is delayed in time and slug-
gish. In the Irish case, labour costs have increased
very rapidly in the context of the expansionary mon-
etary and policy mix of the first years of the euro. In
Italy, the slowdown has not prevented labour costs
from increasing in real terms. Due to slow or negative
productivity growth, the Italian real exchange rate
EEAG Report 70
Chapter 2
20 As a cautionary note on the potential impact of deregulation poli-
cies on stabilisation, it is worth stressing that these policies may have
perverse effects on prices and efficiency in the short-run, for a num-
ber of economic and political-economy considerations. However,
this is not an argument against implementing them.EEAG Report 71
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continued to appreciate during a prolonged period of
demand and growth slowdown. Adjustment is asym-
metric across sectors: It is faster in sectors exposed to
international competition. 
Second, in the short run, adjustment dynamics may
paradoxically move demand in the same direction as
shocks. This point was emphasised early on in the so-
called Walters critique of the EMS. In response to a
demand boom, adjustment does require an increase in
the price level, although this is delayed because of
nominal rigidities. But this means that, in the short
run, expectations of higher inflation can further stim-
ulate aggregate demand. As suggested by the Irish
experience, similar considerations may apply to the
adjustment via labour movements. Immigration of
workers can contain labour shortages caused by
demand shocks, reducing the pressure on prices. Yet,
new migrants also increase expenditure at the aggre-
gate level. 
Third, asset prices, especially housing prices, appear
to play a large quantitatively relevant role in the
dynamics of adjustment. Through their impact on
real estate prices, low real interest rates can fuel sus-
tained construction booms, which outlast the initial
demand shock and contribute to continued real
appreciation. One could argue that the growth of the
housing stock in Ireland is at least in part due to a
convergence process for the capital/population ratio.
Yet, the strong rate of expansion and the high market
valuation of the housing stock clearly point to the
risk of a significant reversal in the rate of activity at
some point in the near future. At that point, the
strong real exchange rate resulting from the ongoing
real appreciation will need to be corrected.
The general lesson for the countries in the monetary
union is that, without exchange rate flexibility, the
inherent dynamics of adjustment are likely at some
point to cause “competitiveness problems”. As we
argued in the introduction, real appreciation and
depreciation via changes in relative inflation are an
essential part of the adjustment process. Yet, because
of rigidities, their timing and size may give rise to
large fluctuations in output and employment. In
response to a negative shock, real depreciation is slow
to materialise, creating macroeconomic stress. In
response to a demand boom, real appreciation is
delayed and overshooting is probable. Real apprecia-
tion during and after a demand boom can thus con-
tain the seeds of a very serious slowdown, entailing
large macroeconomic costs. 
These macroeconomic costs could – and should – be
reduced using fiscal policy to affect aggregate
demand. Internal devaluation, exchanging cuts in
firms’ payroll taxes for rises in other taxes and cuts in
government expenditures, are appropriate policies. In
practice, however, the scope for such fiscal interven-
tion is limited. An alternative which is especially rele-
vant for countries like Italy is to pursue pro-competi-
tion policies that reduce monopoly power in the sec-
tors of the economy least exposed to international
competition. To the extent that such policies result in
more competitive pricing and greater efficiency in ser-
vice sectors, this would enhance Italy’s external com-
petitiveness. The diverging experiences of countries
with high productivity growth, such as Ireland and
the Scandinavian countries on the one hand, and
countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain, on the other,
point to the importance also for short-run adjustment
dynamics that could be played by policies that beef up
productivity growth. 
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